Democrats and National Security

In January 2005, NDN President Simon Rosenberg's commentary on Democrats and National Security appeared in the New Republic:

Time Warp

by Simon Rosenberg

As Peter Beinart wrote, 1947 was indeed a crucible for progressive politics in the United States, and Democrats would do well to recall its lessons. But it was not just anti-communism that gave mid-century liberalism its strength and enduring validity.

In 1947, George Kennan, writing under the pseudonym "X," also offered a competing vision of the proper American response to the gathering Soviet threat. Anti-communism, he said, was not sufficient. To fully meet the Soviet challenge, Kennan believed the United States had first to look inward at its own deepest values. Americans had to know not merely what we opposed, but, more importantly, what we stood for:

The issue of Soviet-American relations is in essence a test of the overall worth of the United States as a nation among nations. To avoid destruction the United States need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman understood this political challenge well. They knew antitotalitarianism alone was not a sufficient battle cry to galvanize a nation weary of war. They saw that, to have resonance, liberalism also must reflect a deepening commitment to American leadership around the world, one that is given form through the values of freedom, equality of opportunity, rule of law, and respect for human rights.

Today, the United States faces an administration that has failed to learn the critical lessons of the twentieth century and has only embraced one half of Kennan's synthesis. This administration is waging a campaign against terrorism, but it has failed to offer a credible vision of how the United States can move the world toward a peace and prosperity rooted in our own best ideals. Moreover, the Bush administration's failing Iraq policy and the serial lies about its intentions and principles have so tarnished U.S. standing abroad that they have unforgivably weakened our ability to conduct and win the struggle against Islamic extremism.

So 2004 is not 1947. The war against Islamic extremism is not the cold war, and Bush is not Roosevelt nor Truman. Our choices are different now. Yes, we as Democrats must articulate and embrace a muscular response to the threat of Islamic extremism and a twenty-first-century version of Kennan's vision of a United States that lives up to its own best traditions. We are also morally obligated to acknowledge that President Bush's record is deeply worthy of skepticism, and we can no more ignore those in our party who have rightfully voiced dissent than we can forget how we won the war against communism.

Our urgent goal as a party should be to work with those who have led the fight against Bush's dangerous policies and, together, to craft a new and compelling vision that is rooted in the very best of the United States and utterly defeats the threat of terrorism. Ultimately, Beinart's framing of our current moment as 1947 redux is instructive, but it is not an accurate description of our time.